Research
Securing aircraft autonomy and the airspace
Our goal is to defend against cyberattacks on aircraft autonomy and airspace operations for eVTOL (electric vertical take-off and landing) aircraft in Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and small drones in UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) Traffic Management (UTM).
Research questions
What we set out to answer
TC1
How can we identify and detect potential cyberattacks on aircraft autonomy and AAM/UTM software architecture?
Raising industry awareness of the vulnerable links and components, and quantifying attack risk to individual aircraft and to the airspace.
TC2
How can we defend individual aircraft and airspace systems against cyberattacks?
Informing investment in technologies and mechanisms that mitigate attack hazards and manage attack risk.
TC3
How can we harden AAM/UTM architectures and the aircraft autonomy software stack with security properties?
Recommending security updates for system architectures, avionics software standards, and CNS infrastructure design.
Technical approach
Three integrated technical challenges
Addressing these interdependent challenges together delivers resilience and safety assurance for automated flight operations, even in the presence of malicious activity.
System context
AAM and UTM system architectures
Research core
TC1 · Identify
Identify vulnerabilities and model attack impact
- 1.1Identify attacks and vulnerabilities in aircraft autonomy and traffic management architectures
- 1.2Model attack impacts and quantify attack risks
- 1.3Monitor and detect attacks with machine learning
TC2 · Defend
Defend aircraft and the airspace
- 2.1Manage security risks in flight planning with belief sharing
- 2.2Mitigate attack hazards during flight at the individual-aircraft level
- 2.3Mitigate attack hazards for multiple aircraft at the airspace level
TC3 · Harden
Design resilient, secure infrastructure
- 3.1Harden the system architecture with security properties
- 3.2Assure the security properties of the integrated architecture
- 3.3Robustify communication between aircraft and traffic management services
- TC1 → TC2Identified attacks and quantified risks
- TC2 → TC3Risk and security requirements, mitigation algorithms
- TC3 → TC1 · TC2System-level security guarantees
V&D · Cross-cutting
Validation and demonstration
- Simulation testing
- Hardware testbeds
- Integrated live-virtual-constructive demonstrations
Standards
CNS infrastructure and avionics standards
Aviation use cases
Eight use cases, cross-team by design
Each use case pairs a credible threat with defenses and brings together teams with complementary expertise.
- CaseUC-01Mission
Vision-Based Delivery and Landing
Making camera- and AI-based package delivery and precision landing trustworthy, even when the scene below can be manipulated.
ThreatPhysical adversarial objects, tampered landing markers, and injected visual text that mislead onboard perception.
Teams- GWU
- UC Irvine
- TSU
TC- TC1
- TC2
- CaseUC-02Mission
Separation Assurance in Shared Airspace
Keeping drones from multiple operators safely apart when fleets, policies, and navigation data differ, or are corrupted.
ThreatGPS/GNSS degradation and spoofing, and unsafe interactions among heterogeneous fleets and collision-avoidance policies.
Teams- GWU
- Purdue
- UT Austin
TC- TC2
- CaseUC-03Mission
Trustworthy Remote ID
Detecting falsified Remote ID broadcasts from the physics of the radio signal, and planning safe paths around suspected spoofers.
ThreatAn aircraft broadcasting false position and velocity to hide its intent or manipulate nearby aircraft.
Teams- Vanderbilt
- UT Austin
TC- TC1
- TC2
- CaseUC-04Mission
Air Traffic Control Voice Integrity
Assessing how convincingly AI speech synthesis can imitate controller instructions, to inform procedural and technical defenses.
ThreatSynthetic controller voices delivering unauthorized instructions over voice radio.
Teams- GWU
TC- TC1
- CaseUC-05Mission
Command-and-Control Link Security
Evaluating and hardening the MAVLink link between ground control stations and drones, and detecting hijacked vehicles.
ThreatInterception, command injection, and telemetry spoofing on unauthenticated control links.
Teams- NVCC
- Vanderbilt
- GWU
- Collins
TC- TC1
- TC3
- CaseUC-06Mission
Resilient eVTOL Emergency Landing
Selecting and tracking a safe landing zone with onboard sensing when an air taxi is impaired by a cyber-physical attack.
ThreatAttacks that degrade navigation or flight capability over a dense urban environment.
Teams- TSU
TC- TC2
- CaseUC-07Mission
Secure and Fair Airspace Coordination
Coordinating flight plans, sequencing, and resources among self-interested operators without a single point of failure.
ThreatCompromised coordinators, strategic misreporting, collusion, and spoofed arrival information.
Teams- Purdue
- UT Austin
- Vanderbilt
TC- TC2
- TC3
- CaseUC-08Mission
Zero-Trust and Formally Assured Architecture
Building drone software architectures with zero-trust patterns, and proving whether attacks are possible with a theorem prover.
ThreatVulnerabilities that propagate between untrusted components of drone and ground-station software.
Teams- Collins
- Vanderbilt
TC- TC3
Integration
How the use cases cover the research tasks
Each use case advances several of the nine proposal tasks, tying the three challenges together.
| Task | UC-01 | UC-02 | UC-03 | UC-04 | UC-05 | UC-06 | UC-07 | UC-08 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Identify attacks and vulnerabilities in aircraft autonomy and traffic management architectures | No | No | No | No | No | |||
| 1.2Model attack impacts and quantify attack risks | No | No | No | No | No | |||
| 1.3Monitor and detect attacks with machine learning | No | No | No | No | No | No | ||
| 2.1Manage security risks in flight planning with belief sharing | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
| 2.2Mitigate attack hazards during flight at the individual-aircraft level | No | No | No | No | No | |||
| 2.3Mitigate attack hazards for multiple aircraft at the airspace level | No | No | No | No | No | |||
| 3.1Harden the system architecture with security properties | No | No | No | No | No | No | ||
| 3.2Assure the security properties of the integrated architecture | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
| 3.3Robustify communication between aircraft and traffic management services | No | No | No | No | No |